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TENTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMS THE DISTRICT COURT’S ORIGINAL 
DECISION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION IN AN APPEAL MADE BY THE 
APPELLANT AFTER LOSING IN ARBITRATION  
Skipper Dean* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Kepas v. eBay,1 the Tenth Circuit considered an appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellant 
arguing the district court erred in its decision to compel arbitration over disputes arising out of the 
employment arbitration agreement.2 Before compelling arbitration, the district court modified the 
arbitration agreement, eliminating the clause which would allow an arbitrator to impose the costs 
of arbitration on the employee and also included Salt Lake County as an alternative location in 
the forum-selection clause.3 It was only after the Appellant pursued his claim through arbitration 
and lost, and after the district court confirmed the arbitrator’s decision, that the Appellant 
appealed the original motion to compel arbitration with the appellate court.4 Applying California 
law as required by the contract’s choice of law provision, the court used the standard dictated in 
Armendariz v. Fountain Health Psychare Services, Inc.,5 to determine whether the district court 
had erred in determining the arbitration agreement was enforceable after making two 
modifications.6 
II.  BACKGROUND 
In July of 2003, eBay hired Emmanuel Kepas to manage its Draper, Utah facility, but was 
first subject to a probationary period.7 At the end of the probation period, eBay offered Appellant 
continued employment on the condition Kepas sign an arbitration agreement recognizing this 
condition.8 The agreement stated that the parties agreed to arbitrate any dispute arising from the 
employment relationship—specifically listing each claim that would later be alleged by Kepas.9 
But the agreement excluded claims made by either party that arose out of the “Employee 
Proprietary Information and Inventions Agreement.”10 The agreement included a forum selection 
clause, which designated Santa Clara County, California as the designated forum.11 Additionally, 
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1 Kepas v. eBay, 412 F. App’x 40 (10th Cir. 2010). 
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11 Id.  
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the agreement provided that the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) rules would apply 
and the choice of law provision within the agreement stated the proceedings would be governed 
by the laws of the State of California.12 The agreement provided that the employer would pay the 
arbitrator’s fee for the proceeding, as well as other AAA charges.13 This provision also granted 
the arbitrator authority to award any type of legal or equitable relief available to a court, including 
attorney’s fees, punitive damages, and the costs of arbitration, which under the AAA rules, 
included all the arbitrator and AAA expenses.14 
Kepas filed his complaint alleging civil rights15 and age discrimination claims,16 as well 
as well as breach of contract and breach of good faith and fair dealing.17 eBay responded with a 
motion to compel arbitration.18 In granting the motion, the court required that the arbitrator shall 
not award eBay with arbitrator fees and could only award eBay costs that would similarly be 
awarded under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.19 The court also modified the agreement to 
enable Kepas to pursue the arbitration in Utah.20 Although securing his choice of forum, Kepas’ 
were all dismissed by the arbitrator on summary judgment. The district court subsequently 
confirmed the arbitration award.21 Kepas then appealed the initial district court decision to 
compel arbitration, arguing that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable on grounds of 
unconscionability.22 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Kepas argued that the arbitration agreement failed to satisfy the minimum requirements 
established in Armendariz v. Fountain Health Psychare Services, Inc.,23 rendering the agreement 
unconscionable.24 He further argued those defects rendered the entire arbitration agreement 
unenforceable.25 The Armendariz standard applies to employer mandated arbitration agreements 
that force employees to waive their statutory rights, requiring that arbitration agreements provide 
employees with the ability to secure (1) neutral arbitrators, (2) more than minimal discovery, (3) 
an arbitral decision in writing, (4) all relief that would otherwise be available in court, and (4) 
assurance from employers that they will not require employees to pay unreasonable costs, 
arbitrator fees, or expenses as a condition to arbitrate.26 The court determined that California law 
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governed the dispute, as this was listed as the choice-of-law within the arbitration agreement.27 
Armendariz was thus the legal standard applicable between Kepas and eBay.28 
Kepas argued the arbitration agreement failed under Armendariz because the employee 
could be forced to pay the arbitrator fees and AAA costs through the arbitral award. 29 The court 
stated the agreement allowed for an arbitrator to award any legal or equitable remedy available in 
a court proceeding, including the costs of arbitration.30 Following the parties' choice of law 
provision, the court looked to the AAA meaning of "costs of arbitration", which defined the term 
as "all expenses of the arbitrator...and any AAA expenses." The court determined that under this 
meaning the arbitration agreement failed the minimum requirements because it imposed a 
significant risk on the employee to pay the arbitration costs.31 The court rejected eBay’s argument 
that a provision provided for the employer to pay the arbitrator fees and other AAA costs, 
emphasizing that the provision only suggested that eBay would bear these costs initially, but 
created the possibility of the arbitrator later enforcing these costs on the employee.32 Since the 
agreement gave the arbitrator authority to impose the costs of arbitration as part of the award, 
creating a significant risk that employees could be required to bear arbitration costs, the award 
provision was contrary to public policy.33 
Before determining the result of this defect, the court addressed Kepas’s second argument 
that the forum-selection provision failed Armendariz because employees could be required to 
incur unreasonable travel costs for employee witnesses who were forced to travel from Utah to a 
distant arbitration proceeding in California.34 The court found this argument unpersuasive 
because witness travel costs are not unique to arbitration and did not violate the Armendariz 
requirements.35 
Kepas also argued that the scope of the arbitration agreement and the forum-selection 
clause were unconscionable.36 To be found unconscionable under California state law, 
agreements are required to be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, although it is 
not required that each element be equally unconscionable.37 In determining the procedural 
element, the court considered whether the arbitration agreement was a contract of adhesion, 
whether oppression played a role in the process, and whether a party was surprised by hidden 
terms.38 The court determined that this was an adhesive contract because it was a standard 
contract, drafted and imposed by the stronger party, and left the employee only with the option of 
accepting or rejecting the terms as written.39 The court next determined the agreement was 
oppressive because, as an employee, Kepas was not in a position to bargain for alternative 
contract terms.40 Last, the court determined that the agreement lacked the remaining element of 
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surprise because the agreement was typewritten on two pages, and the terms, such as the forum 
clause selecting the state of the employer’s headquarters as the location, were not beyond Kepas’s 
reasonable expectations.41 Therefore, while there was procedural unconscionability under the first 
two elements, the level was reduced due to the lack of surprise.42 
Substantive unconscionability exists when an arbitration agreement lacks mutuality.43 
This occurs when the agreement compels arbitration for the claims most likely to be brought by 
the weaker party, but exempts those most likely to be brought by the stronger party,44 or when 
employees are required to arbitrate claims that arise out of the same transaction that the employer 
can litigate.45 Kepas argued the arbitration agreement lacked mutuality because it excluded from 
arbitration the claims of either party that “arise out of the Employee Proprietary Information and 
Inventions Agreement”, and Kepas contended that eBay was the party more likely to bring these 
types of claims.46  
In determining that the agreement was sufficiently bilateral, the court rejected this 
argument because Kepas could not identify the types of claims which would be excluded and had 
not satisfied his burden to support his claim.47 The court found that both cases Kepas used as 
precedents, Mercuro v. Superior Court48 and Fitz v. NCR Corp.,49 did not apply because they 
were distinguishable.50 The court distinguished Mercuro because the language in the agreement 
excluded claims for injunctive or equitable relief, and lacked mutuality because employers would 
generally seek injunctive relief, not employees.51 By contrast, the exclusion in eBay’s agreement 
excluded claims arising out of the “Employee Propriety Information and Inventions Agreement,” 
which applied to both employer and employee claims regardless of the relief sought.52  
In Fitz, the agreement excluded claims arising from “intellectual property rights,” and the 
court held the agreement lacked mutuality because the exclusion would most likely be used by 
the employers and not employees.53 While the court stated Fitz was more analogous to the 
arbitration agreement at issue here, the court emphasized the key distinction was that many eBay 
employees develop their own inventions, and this unique industry made it likely that both 
employees and eBay could bring the type of claims excluded from the arbitration agreement, and, 
therefore, Fitz did not apply.54 Since the claims excluded from arbitration were likely to be 
brought by either party, the court determined the arbitration agreement did not lack mutuality.55 
Substantive unconscionability similarly exists when an arbitration agreement is harsh or 
oppressive, and Kepas argued the forum-selection clause was unreasonably oppressive because it 
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imposed additional expenses and impaired his ability to secure witnesses.56 The court emphasized 
that Kepas was required to prove that enforcement would be unfair or unreasonable, that the 
forum would be so overly difficult and inconvenient that it essentially deprives the employee of 
his day in court, or show there is no rational basis for the forum choice.57 The court determined 
that Kepas had not shown that the forum would effectively preclude him from bringing his 
dispute, and the hardship in securing witnesses was diminished because Kepas could obtain their 
testimony through a deposition in Utah.58 In addition, since eBay’s principal place of business is 
California, the court noted that there was a reasonable connection between the cause of action and 
the forum selected.59  Therefore, although the district court originally modified the forum-
selection provision in its decision to compel arbitration, the court determined that the original 
forum-selection provision was not substantively unconscionable, because it did not preclude 
Kepas from asserting his claims and the forum was rationally related to the cause of action.60  
The court concluded that the potential for the arbitrator to impose the “costs of 
arbitration” on the employee was the sole defect in the arbitration agreement and determined that 
the objectionable term could be severed, allowing for the enforcement of the remainder of the 
arbitration agreement.61 An arbitration agreement that fails the conscionability standard can still 
be enforceable if the offending term can be severed,62 the main inquiry being whether the 
severance would further “the interests of justice.”63 The court noted several factors used by 
California courts to determine severability: whether the illegality is collateral to the main purpose, 
whether the agreement contains more than one objectionable term, and whether striking the single 
provision would remove the illegality from the agreement.64 The court determined the 
objectionable provision was severable because the provision allowing the costs of arbitration as 
an award was collateral to the central purpose, the award provision was the only objectionable 
provision, and the deficiency of the arbitration agreement could be easily reconciled by removing 
the offending term.65 The court agreed with the district court’s determination that the remainder 
of the arbitration agreement was enforceable and affirmed the district court’s decision to compel 
arbitration in the original proceedings.66 
IV.  SIGNIFICANCE  
Kepas is significant because it allows for judicial review of an original court decision 
after the party has already completed the arbitration proceedings and lost. After the district court 
modified the arbitration agreement and compelled arbitration, Kepas decided to comply with the 
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decision and pursue his claims through the arbitration process.67 It was only after the arbitrator 
ruled in favor of eBay that Kepas appealed to have the original motion to compel arbitration 
reversed. This expands the scope of judicial review beyond the narrow means mandated in 
Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).68 
Kepas also illustrates that the Tenth Circuit will employ the choice-of-law provision as 
written by the parties, even when the designated law is from another jurisdiction. Here, the court 
used California law to review the dispute based on the choice-of-law provision agreed upon by 
the parties within the arbitration agreement.69 This gives guidance to practitioners when drafting 
arbitration agreements in knowing that the Tenth Circuit will honor the agreement and analyze 
the dispute under the designated choice-of-law agreed upon by the drafting parties. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
While it is not uncommon for courts to sever or modify offending provisions in otherwise 
valid and enforceable arbitration agreements, the district court’s decision to insert Salt Lake 
County as an additional arbitral forum requires some analysis. While the opinion does not contain 
the district court’s reasoning in making the modification, it is interesting to note that the appellate 
court determined that the original forum-selection clause did not fail the Armendariz standard, 
and was not substantively unconscionable.70 The court ultimately determined that the district 
court properly restricted the arbitration agreement in regards to the arbitral award provision, and 
was correct in compelling arbitration.71 Yet it would seem that if the original forum-selection 
clause was valid and enforceable, the district court overstepped its authority in modifying this. It 
is unclear why the appellate court does not address this. 
In addition, the most alarming and confusing aspect of this opinion is that the appellate 
court granted the appeal of the original motion to compel arbitration after the Kepas had 
completed the arbitration proceedings and lost.72 It should appear that if the Kepas disagreed with 
the district court’s ruling, the proper time to appeal would be immediately after the district court 
decision, not after the Kepas failed to achieve a favorable result in arbitration. This creates the 
impression of a losing party attempting to get another bite at the apple after an unfavorable ruling 
in arbitration. Entertaining this claim questions the binding nature and finality of the arbitrator’s 
decision established under section two of the FAA.73 It is unclear as to the court’s reasoning for 
this, because it says nothing in regards to the timing of the appeal. And the effect remains to be 
seen in the Tenth Circuit. 
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